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*   *   * 
 
Approaching the Debate 
 
Developments in the life sciences have sometimes projected East Asia into the 
news headlines, with reports on doubtful research on human subjects and cloning. 
Concerns are raised over the trends of research and the stands taken by East Asia 
countries on bioethics. Major breakthroughs have been anticipated and reported 
from cloning laboratories of life sciences institutions, notably in China1  and 
South Korea.2 Although the claims that human beings have actually been cloned 
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successfully in East Asia have been proved to be false,3 direct and perhaps pre-
mature comments have been made asserting a strong cultural element in an ethos 
that would make such activities possible if not directly supporting them.4 In the 
meantime, the scientific community had to learn the hard way that the science 
ethics referred to is little more than lip.5 However, partly as a result of the hectic 
policy-making activities sparked off by this hype, national bioethics regulations 
in both countries now seem to express a rather liberal policy regarding the utilisa-
tion of embryonic human life for the purpose of cloning research.6 The actual 
debates among ethicists in East Asia related to these issues are not widely known 
in Western Europe or North America. This deficiency stands in sharp contrast 
with the highly developed collaborations between these regions and China within 
the life sciences.  
For more than a decade, China’s bioethics has been gaining shape and mo-
mentum. The International Association for Bioethics’ (IAB) decision to hold 
their eighth world congress in Beijing from August 6-9, 2006 indicated a notable 
upgrading for China and the country’s domestic bioethicists within the interna-
tional arena. From a symbolic point of view, bioethics, as an integration of theo-
retical and practical approaches, has some potential to trigger the advancement of 
science. It is situated at a cross-disciplinary junction of the humanities and social 
sciences and the life sciences and medicine, and is influenced by a variety of 
stakeholders’ interests. It could thus be expected to inspire and engage the intel-
lectual avant-garde, becoming a force for moulding the intellectual shape of con-
temporary China and, eventually, an indicator of China’s cultural stance after 
three decades of stunning transformations.  
Observers who anticipate that East Asian countries will perform in unex-
pected ways, based on their specific cultural heritage, are likely to welcome the 
event of IAB 8 taking place in Beijing and to foresee fresh input from East Asian 
cultures to the global debates in bioethics. Such expectations are bolstered by the 
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names of the leading players involved. Since the founding of the Asian Bioethics 
Association (ABA) in 1995,7 the quest to construct a cultural identity in the form 
of a Confucian, Chinese, Asian or otherwise East Asian ethos, has been a major 
theme on the agenda of the protagonists.8 Recently, this was reconfirmed by the 
title of the Sixth Asian Bioethics Association Conference that took place in 
Sanliurfa, Turkey on “Inter-Cultural Bioethics: Asia and the West” (14-18 No-
vember 2005).  
A newly published book Bioethics: Asian Perspectives. A Quest for Moral 
Diversity9 is useful in this regard. Edited by Qiu Renzong, (president of the 8th 
World Congress of Bioethics), this volume can be regarded as the latest contribu-
tion in a series of works that attempt to explore an original path towards moder-
nity. This approach, rooted in the fields of bioethics, is said to be nursed by 
sources of East Asian traditions and to respond to the characteristics of the dif-
ferent societies in the region. The book continues the rhetorical scheme of the 
human rights debates of the 1990’s, arguing for a “third” way towards modernisa-
tion, with Asian or “Chinese characteristics.” Although it needs to be distin-
guished from the merely ideological purpose of similar discourses, its apodictic 
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Puzzles about Culturalism 
 
For a European observer, this book provides a welcome opportunity to discuss 
the achievements of this school in some detail. Earlier attempts to discern what is 
unique about Asian bioethics suggest the need for a careful appraisal.10  
First, it is difficult to tell what the term Asian bioethics actually means. Ana-
lytically and empirically clear descriptions by Asian authors are rare and incom-
prehensive. In a chapter for an anthology, Beijing medical ethicist Cong Yali has 
introduced some major themes and concerns. She explains that, in China,  
 
the discussion of bioethics is still mainly found in the medi-
cal colleges and academy, and it is still a common phe-
nomenon that clinicians do not think that bioethics concerns 
them. Even in the broad sense of medical ethics, only a very 
small percentage of clinicians really participate in the activi-
ties of medical ethics and few show their medical students 
the ethical aspects of their clinical practice. So, the most se-
rious problem facing the future of bioethics in China lies not 
in the barrier from traditional culture, but in the divorce of 
medical ethics and the clinical practice.11  
 
Another Beijing bioethicist, like Cong a second generation ethicist from the (now 
terminated) postgraduate bioethics program at the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, Zhai Xiaomei, has produced a survey of bioethics in China, though it is 
far from comprehensive.12 In addition, there is scattered information about it on 
private and institutional websites.13 Some of these sites are promoted by foreign 
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interests.14 In general, after a decade of intense study of this area, I have not been 
able to find sources that reveal a discernable and systematic effort within China’s 
bioethics research to cover the entire field, not to mention any programmatic and 
conceptual groundwork comparing different methods and theories. None of these 
works seem to confirm that China’s bioethics is an expression of a strong, mono-
lithic ethical foundation of “Asian” origin. Rather, the debate is composed of a 
diversity of opinions of individuals from different academic and ideological 
backgrounds, with diverging moral or political agendas. This is why this paper 
introduces one group of scholars within the field of bioethics and medical ethics 
who are connected by the common theme of an “Asian” ethos.  
Second, the term is hard to identify. How is “Asia” to be defined? The change 
of the name of the most relevant academic body, from the East Asian Association 
for Bioethics to the Asian Bioethics Association, in 1998, hardly helped in this 
regard. A region that stretches from Israel to Japan and from Siberia to the Phil-
ippines cannot provide much common or consistent moral orientation. On the 
other hand, slightly more conceptually framed designations, such as “Confucian-
ism”, have already proven their capacity for generating divergent and even an-
tagonistic opinions. They carry the additional burden of an implausible commen-
surability of a “Confucian” (of whatever kind) and “Asian” ethos. If we, on the 
other hand, choose to refer to individuals and institutions as culturally relevant 
indicators for such a particular moral constitution, we immediately contradict the 
claims of “Asian” essence.  
Third, the term is somewhat misleading. Perhaps the trouble lies in expecta-
tions of the assumed unique characteristics of an Asian bioethics. Chinese ethi-
cist, Nie Jingbao, has dismissed such expectations as “myths”.15  
In this review, I shall try to discuss a major candidate for an approach towards 
an essentially Asian way to bioethics. I argue that it would be more appropriate to 
frame the debate in terms of bioethics inside Asia.  
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None of the relevant contributions can claim a clearly discernible bioethics 
conception, and, more basically, Asia can only be comprehended in regional 
geographic terms, not as some all-embracing entity.  
 
 
Players and Organs 
 
This school of East Asian bioethics has presented itself, during the last decade, at 
numerous regional and international academic gatherings. It has sought to expand 
and engage in political lobbying, producing a substantial body of writings.16 
Since 1995, bioethics in East Asia has evolved dynamically. The discipline has 
grown in response to critical issues raised by advances in the life sciences, such 
as from the Human Genome Project and the newly moulded technological and 
economic paradigms in medicine. In China, these developments are situated 
within the rapid transformations in the social, medical and regulatory systems. 
The cultural context and normative orientation for Chinese bioethics is just 
emerging. At this time, the various books on the subject highlight the conceptual 
and programmatic heritage of the first generation of bioethics thinkers in East 
Asia, since the hand-over from Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin. Many contribu-
tions are part of the “Philosophy and Medicine” series at Kluwer Academic Pub-
lishers, edited by H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., one of the earliest promoters of 
Sino-US exchange and co-operation in the area of medical ethics.  
In the absence of institutions and procedures for interested parties in China to 
articulate their interests as in a civil society, two major forces have been driving 
the growth of bioethics. First, academics and administrators, with the explicit 
aspiration to establish bioethics as a proper discipline on a level with the interna-
tional life science community and relevant regulations, have been focussing on 
issues of research ethics. This goes hand in hand with China’s institutional glob-
alisation. Within a process of standardisation following Chinas accession to the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), the country aims to implement the agree-
ments on intellectual property rights, patenting and protection of the entire re-
search and development process.17 This includes the safeguarding of China’s 
biological resources, such as body tissue, blood or embryos, for the benefit of the 
researcher or national economy. Key intellectuals in this field, including their 
mentor, Qiu Renzong, often have a background in the philosophy of science and 
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technology, especially “natural dialectics” (ziran bianzhengfa 自 然 辩 证 法), 
that is, a particular approach of Communist ideology to the natural sciences.  
The political department primarily in charge here is the Ministry of Science 
and Technology (MOST), with connections to the National Natural Science 
Foundation (NNSFC), by far China’s major public research supporter.18 It works 
towards the advancement of the hard and natural sciences and global competi-
tiveness for China’s researchers. At the same time, it is obliged to protect China’s 
intellectual and material resources from foreign access. In this context funding 
for ethics is difficult because the otherwise heavily subsided NNSFC does not 
have a separate budget for it. However, this foundation is much better funded 
than the notoriously under-equipped Academy of Medical Sciences or the Acad-
emy of Social Sciences. In the past, it has been a rewarding strategy for bioethi-
cists to directly approach private non-Chinese sponsors, such as the Ford Founda-
tion with their traditionally excellent ties with China. In the absence of wealthy 
domestic private foundations, and given the interest in China from abroad, for-
eign aid could have a significant impact on the development of bioethics in 
China.  
On the other hand, the modern Chinese tradition of medical ethics has a 
longer history than that of bioethics.19 It is related to the profession of the physi-
cian, with the associated paternalistic moral aspirations, but with no independent 
professional or institutional mandate in medical ethics. This perspective covers 
ethics in a clinical context, the doctor-patient relationship, social and economic 
transformation and the health care sector. The collapse of the “Iron Rice Bowl” 
social security system since the late 1970s has required a thorough reinvention of 
the medical sector, with ethics on the agenda to a greater or lesser extent. Con-
cern is now directed at economic matters, access to health services and other 
issues surrounding potential social instability and the undermining of public trust 
in the government, the latter having become acute during the SARS crisis.20 
Here, the Ministry of Health (MoH) is in charge of policy-making and develop-
ment, partly overlapping with MOST. Thus, a domestic agenda primarily drives 
discussion on China’s medical ethics.21  
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Bioethics and medical ethics in China share some concerns and strategic in-
terests, both in terms of individual actors and historical roots, as well as institu-
tionally and structurally (for example, in the drafting of ethical regulations for 
research, bio-banking and clinical practice related to reproductive medicine). The 
major outlets for published works are, first, Yixue yu zhexue 医 学 与 哲 学 
(Medicine and Philosophy), published in Dalian, China’s most distinguished 
bioethics forum, with its tradition in the “studies in natural dialectics”, now redi-
rected towards a humanitarian mission and a clear medical and health care-
related agenda. Second, Zhongguo yixue lunlixue 中 国 医 学 伦 理 学 (Journal 
of Chinese Medical Ethics), published in Xi’an, which offers discussions of ethi-
cal issues on a more practical level. Notably, there is as yet no formal journal 
representing Chinese bioethics. The official organ of the ABA, that is, the Eubios 
Journal for Asian and International Bioethics (EJAIB), represents a diversity of 
Asian voices in the field, with some dominance by southern and eastern Asia. 
Another periodical, Zhongwai yixue zhexue 中 外 医 学 哲 学 (Chinese & Inter-
national Philosophy of Medicine), published in Hong Kong and Beijing, was 
launched in 1998, with a focus on introducing selected bioethics topics, debates 
and standards mainly from US American perspectives and a few Chinese discus-
sions. This purpose, to acquaint Chinese intellectuals with current American 
bioethics, is also reflected in the most relevant Chinese monograph on bio-
ethics.22 No notable efforts towards an integrated culturally “Asian” ethics theory 
are offered in these publications. Very recently, honorary president of China’s 
Medical Ethics Association, Du Zhizheng, edited a Chinese “Medical Ethics 
Dictionary” (Yixuelunlixue cidian 医 学 伦 理 学 词 典).23 This important work 
can be regarded as China’s first major effort to standardise medical ethics termi-
nology and concepts. However, the collection is dominated by authors with no 
special training in biomedical ethics.  
 
 
Concepts and Arguments 
 
The “Asian ethos” group of ethicists claims to be constructing a moral framework 
according to Asian traditions that would challenge the dominant “Western” forms 
of bioethics, one suitable to the demands of East Asian societies. One undisputed 
spiritual leader of this movement, in terms of academic recognition, political 
cunning, influence and productivity is Qiu Renzong. It is thus no coincidence that 
Qiu has edited the state-of-the-art volume on the subject. He takes pride in ob-
serving that all chapters in this book have been written by “non-Westerners”. In 
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fact, 13 out of 19 titles have Chinese authors. As Qiu remarks, “I have been 
deeply impressed by how diverse the views of these contributors are on bio-
ethical issues even within an Asian cultural context.”24 Universalistic approaches 
should be rejected, because, “the final answer cannot be deduced from an over-
arching global ethics.” Qiu warns against an otherwise anonymous “leading fig-
ure” in bioethics who “may not impose his solution on other people.” Qiu cau-
tions the reader that, “nothing could prevent this kind of imposition from leading 
to the kind of ethical imperialism that some bioethicists in developing countries 
understandably worry about.”25 
Notwithstanding this categorical admonishment, “some values” or rules 
should be shared in common, in the sense of minimal denominators for bioethics, 
namely general statements such as “Do not kill the innocent.” The practice of 
interpreting and applying such standards can be many and varied. For example, in 
Buddhism this imperative extends to any form of animal life, whereas Confucians 
would accept the killing of human foetuses. Moreover, a verdict such as “Do not 
steal”, for a Confucian, does not refer to all kinds of property, since, Qiu reas-
sures us, “stealing books is not stealing.”26  
The limit of acceptable normative commonality in bioethics, accordingly, is a 
strategic consensus (“these co-ordinated efforts have to be and only can be 
achieved by consensus”). Other modes of controversy, such as contests for best 
arguments, or a discourse, are thus excluded from bioethics, leaving room only 
for procedural, formal and strategic approaches.27 Any position aiming at more 
ambitious ethical projects is suspected of hegemony or imperialism. This seems 
to refer also to approaches that probe into the underlying meta-structures of prac-
tical reasoning, seeking to integrate moral diversity and universality under the 
basic assumption that aspiring for “good practice” is universally reasonable.  
Qiu concludes this conceptual sketch on a bold note:  
 
I believe that the diversity or pluralism of bioethical views 
will promote the growth of bioethics just as the late philoso-
pher of science, Paul Feyerabend, argued that the prolifera-
tion of scientific theories promotes the growth of knowl-
edge.28 
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What exactly is the meaning here of “proliferation” used in a sense analogous to 
knowledge within the context of an ethics discourse? Without offering much 
explanation, Qiu seems to refer to co-operating sub-systems of “different cul-
tures”, each of which has made a practical impact on bioethics in ways akin to 
scientific sub-disciplines or disciplines. It is not clear how such cultures should 
be defined and distinguished from one another. However, one might even enquire 
as to whether a plausible concept of culture is suited to supporting such an anal-
ogy in the first place.29  
Undoubtedly, sharing of work through inter-disciplinary co-operation can be 
instrumental to the advancement of science. But the possible contribution from 
regionally, ethnically or religiously defined “cultures” to the formation of univer-
sally obliging ethical standards is far from obvious, without relating it to presup-
posed underlying values such as “righteousness” or “humanity”. Moreover, an 
explication of the purpose of such proposed work-sharing of “cultures” in bio-
ethics would be welcome. What would be a purpose analogous to the advance-
ment of knowledge that drives science? Most Chinese authors refer to “human-
ity” or “humaneness” (ren 仁). Medicine, for instance, is dubbed the “art of hu-
maneness” (yi nai renshu 医 乃 仁 术). Often it is given the function of counter-
balancing tendencies of reductionism (medical or genetic reductionism) as they 
are criticised in “the West”.30 
Apparently, any agreement on the basis of a telos, such as a “good life”, as a 
guiding purpose of bioethics would have to be framed in terms of normative 
universalism, which the authors expressly reject. However, even Qiu’s sceptical 
approach seems to depend on some fundamental prescriptive axioms, such as the 
positive respect for “another culture”. This approach seems to be unaware of the 
intrinsic normative implications. Historical precedence, in the case for instance of  
“imperialism”, which Qiu rightly quotes, demands special regard and recognition 
for the interests and views of affected people, as well as some restraint towards 
judging “another culture”, whether in positive or negative ways.  
As to the position of culture within bioethics, Qiu elaborates: “The intellec-
tual foundation of bioethics is entrenched in or closely related to particular cul-
tures. In Asia there are Confucian, Taoist, Buddhist, Hindu, Islamic, Christian 
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and many other cultures.”31 Thus, religion and culture become interchangeable. 
The postulate of one specific Asian culture would thus be a contradiction in 
terms. This observation has an immediate effect on several advocates of an 
“Asian ethos” in the same volume.32 A similar substantial and heterogeneous 
religious mixture can be described on other continents as well. Moreover, the 
phenomenon of cultural contingency should not be ignored. For example, re-
nowned “hybrids”, such as the Chinese physician, founder of the Chinese Repub-
lic, Christian and Confucian, Sun Yatsen, together with several contemporary 
ethicists, could be assessed in such cultural terms only if one were to analytically 
dismember them into different individuals.  
More important than a crude concept of culture, and more difficult to address, 
is the level of academic quality and scholarship that emerges from beneath the 
shadows of the self-proclaimed “cultural authenticity”.33  With surprising fre-
quency, arguments appear feeble and inappropriate considering the facts and 
theoretical foundations presented, especially as regards the strong culturalistic 
claims. This makes understanding and co-operation more difficult, adding a dip-
lomatic consideration that borders on strategic rhetoric―something that might 
conflict with the scientific virtue of plain sincerity.  For example, the textual 
sources of the “Confucian” tradition or those of “Western” origin are recon-
structed in vague and arbitrary ways. They do not use standardised terminology, 
lack philological annotations and rarely give references, if at all. As far as “West-
ern” sources are concerned, they hardly represent the breadth of European schol-
arship on ethics. The reader is certainly not left leave with the impression of an 
author familiar with the original canon or tradition.34  
On top of this, the ethics debate is burdened with strong culturalistic and 
moral views. For example, some authors, when considering fundamental theoreti-
cal categories, offer arbitrary contradictions. In such a vein, Tang Refeng sug-
gests focussing on what is “good” instead of “right”. In the context of China’s 
population policy, he observes a duality of approaches:  
 
One is scientific.... The other is the philosophical approach 
which has little to do with the analysis and prediction of 
facts, but only provides a methodological foundation.35 
 
Accordingly, science would be reduced to positivistic and formalistic matters. It 
is not explained on the basis of which heuristics a mere methodical “philosophy” 
could be integrated with such a concept of science. In turn, without such a com-
                                                 
31
 Qiu (2004), p. 2. 
32
 E.g. Hyakudai Sakamoto. “The Foundations of a Possible Asian Bioethics,” in Qiu 
(2004), pp. 45-48. 
33
 Fan, in Qiu (2004), p. 67. 
34
 Cf. in some detail, Döring (2004), pp. 216-227. 
35
 Tang Refeng, in Qiu (2004), p. 173. 
138 EASTM 25 (2006) 
patibility requirement, the character of philosophy as a scientific or meta-
scientific venture would be undermined.  
To take his account of China’s population policies as an example, Tang 
shows little awareness of the related social and ethical issues. “My conclusion is, 
Chinese thinking on population policy is a kind of mature ‘good’ ethics which we 
shall carry out thoroughly. That is, we shall always consider whether our actions 
are good at every stage or level; we should not be satisfied with just doing the 
‘right’ thing.” And, finally, “We must study the current Chinese situation care-
fully, and not let Western principles of ‘right’ stop us from making good 
choices.”36 Here, recent legal reforms and severe domestic criticism of the first 
25 years of the actual practice of the “one-child-policy” are being ignored.37  
Tang provides no reason why ethics should need to be based alternatively on 
either “what is right” or “what is good”, or to define “right” in terms other than 
secular. It would be perfectly sound to base it on integrated concepts of right and 
good, which, consequentially, can be understood as an expression of aspired 
excellence of a higher order, on the meta-level, from a philosophical point of 
view. The distinction is arbitrary and misleading. It does not serve for a better 
understanding of “how to make population policy best contribute to the quality of 
life” (p. 182), as if quality could proceed without either “good” or “right”. In the 
concluding vote for a “situational” moral judgement according to “good choice”, 
Tang indeed presupposes (inexplicitly) a general moral assumption that corre-
sponds with common moral intuition as well as contingency of practice.  
Altogether, this approach makes extensive use of a dualistic conceptual 
framework. Science is distinct from philosophy, empiricism stands against the 
methodical approach, theory counters practice, globalism opposes localism, East 
contradicts West, good is critical of right - the list of such antinomies could be 
easily extended. Notably, this contribution to an Asian bioethics expressly de-
pends upon an eclectic perception of minority or extreme positions within the 
American debate (that is, here, Gilligan’s feminist ethics and Dreyfus’ phenome-
nology),38 but notably not on established authorities of Chinese philosophy or the 
relevant sciences.  
Correspondingly, it is apparent that cultural essentialists in only a few excep-
tional cases refer explicitly to Chinese (or for that matter Asian) textual sources, 
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even when they declare holding a Confucian position.39 Qiu Renzong simply 
refers to Xunzi―a representative of the authoritarian chapter within the Confu-
cian tradition.40  
Some authors seem to use the bioethics debate as an opportunity for promot-
ing their own ethical agenda. Edwin Hui (Xu Zhiwei), for example, advocates 
“Confucianism” with a conservative Christian flavour, referring to the Confucian 
concept of the human being. Becoming a human being, accordingly, “is carried 
out in and through the social context for the purpose of fulfilling social responsi-
bility rather than self-actualization per se.”41 This is an interesting social ethics 
proposition in its own right. However, it is loaded with a heavy conceptual bur-
den. According to Hui, it constitutes an essentially cultural difference to “the 
West”, which, in turn, finds itself being stereotyped rather than properly pre-
sented.  
 
In most Western countries, it is entirely a matter of a 
woman’s right or autonomous choice to abort a fetus. The 
Chinese holistic and social personhood suggests ... that the 
sexual partner’s opinions and desires may not be set aside 
entirely as it is done in the West.42  
 
The implicit political dimension of such doctrines framed in terms of bioethics is 
conspicuous in an argument by Fan Ruiping: 
 
We should recognize that all past attempts to read into Con-
fucianism liberal democratic concerns with liberty, equality, 
human rights and liberal democracy ... is a form of naive 
presentism. The truth of the matter is that cardinal Confu-
cian concepts ... presuppose understandings of morality and 
justice that are not reducible without loss of essential mean-
ing to liberal individualist concerns with equality, rights and 
justice.43 
 
This off-hand rejection of original Chinese attempts to “democratise” Confucian-
ism speaks of a lack of appreciation of more optimistic proponents of such ef-
forts. One would hesitate to call modern Neo-Confucian scholars such as Zhang 
Junmai, Xie Yuwei, Xu Fuguan, Mou Zongsan and Tang Junyi naive for their 
quest for “the objective adherence to a course of righteousness through rea-
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son”,44 as formulated by the “Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture” 
of 1958. The reader wonders whether one should take it for granted that the au-
thor has thoroughly studied such material or other relevant sinological literature. 
A self-confident attitude cannot compensate for a lack of discussion of the rele-
vant and rather lively Chinese debates.45  
Disregarding this and other relevant Chinese scholarship, in a bold move Fan 
ventures to postulate the superiority of his newly invented “reconstructionist 
Confucianism”. “Reconstructionist Confucianism holds that it provides a more 
ample account of human flourishing and morality than that offered by other ac-
counts.”46 Obviously, Fan uses his particular rendition of Confucianism to con-
struct a “culturally Chinese / Asian morality”, rather than to reconstruct a tradi-
tional pattern from China’s culture.  
Only a few Chinese bioethicists acknowledge the modern or critical-
progressive patterns in Confucian ethics. As far as authors from the Chinese 
mainland are concerned, there is a tendency to ascribe conservatism and anti-
modernism to Confucianism.47 It indicates a development of social mores that 
call for revision and transformation in terms of adaptability to modernity, rather 
than promise a timely vision that could guide modernisation.  
However, a few differing voices have been raised from outside the bioethics 
community.48 For example, Cheng Chung-ying, in a philosophical discussion of 
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bioethics, refers to the moral transformation of human beings, “morality requires 
an inner source of development and creativity”, that “presupposes that the human 
being is a free and creative agent with autonomy of his own will, and that he is 
capable of self-discipline and self-control.” 49  This seemingly modern notion 
includes the concept of a “human process-identity”.50 It synthesizes the patterns 
of individual moral development and the relational or social nature of the human 
being, and generates a multi-dimensional concept of humanity.  
Regarding the comparative statements of Asian relativists (notably, Fan 
claims to deliver “a more ample account”), these include an implicit universal 
claim to deliver a better moral philosophy, in terms of humanity. Fan, like his 
mentor, Qiu Renzong, does not venture to elaborate on the (potentially self-
defeating) consequences of this universalistic undercurrent, nor does he offer 
much reference material in support of his argument. Quite the contrary, in an-
other of his texts that tries to establish an essentially East Asian variant of 
“autonomy”, Fan frankly declares, “I have not found any expression of the East 
Asian principle of autonomy in the literature, I will attempt to offer a statement of 
it (...).”51  
This may be reminiscent of the typical Confucian intellectual’s understanding 
of themselves as a missionary and custodian of moral rectification.52 Here, it is 
presented with a political slant. Fan “calls for restructuring social institutions 
through reformulating public policy in accordance with fundamental Confucian 
moral and political commitments rather than modern Western liberal social-
democratic concerns.”53 
Some time ago, and without comparable sources to work on, Ruth Macklin 
explained how this argument amounts to crude cultural ethical relativism, grossly 
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stereotyping cultures according to an East-West framework to serve political 
interests.54  Her warning goes largely unnoticed among the authors discussed 
here. Instead the scattered scholarly basis of the explicit claims to distinction on 
cultural-genetic grounds (i.e. Fan), as well as the self-strengthening rhetoric (i.e. 
Qiu), indicates a poorly established fundamental theoretical grasp of the condi-
tions and terms of a cross-cultural understanding in normative matters. It reaches, 
in its destructive consequences, beyond bioethics. Even when it is expressed in 
diplomatic phrases (such as Qiu’s approach that it would be “more adequate in 
the Asian context”),55 the notorious image of imperialism is summoned up as a 
threat to developing countries. 
 
 
Dissent and Inconsistencies 
 
There are, however, several authors, including some in Qiu’s volume, who chal-
lenge this framework.56 Julia Tao, a philosopher from Hong Kong, discusses 
American bioethics, her critique of an overly individualised understanding of 
“autonomy” embedded in a well-reasoned diagnosis and constructive attitude 
towards the conceptual achievements of the ethics discourse. She argues against 
an imbalance of legal form and content. Law is appreciated as an instrument, but 
should not overwhelm ethical substance and purpose (such as the promotion of 
the common good), as can be perceived in misapplications of the informed-
consent idea. Thus, Tao refers to concepts of appropriateness and sincerity, both 
key virtues and principles according to Confucian (or, for instance, Stoic) phi-
losophy, but hesitates to attach to them a culturalistic rhetoric. She illustrates her 
ethical point by defining “public health as a common good”,57 thereby continuing 
arguments from her earlier works and making them instructive in practical and 
analytical terms.58 Tao takes the opportunity here to challenge the majority of the 
contributions in this volume. Another example is Ip Po-keung, an analytical phi-
losopher based in Hong Kong and Taiwan, who maintains the allegedly “non-
rights-based notion of personhood” as a vital part of Confucianism.59  
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In sum, the conceptual framework and cultural outlook in this volume reiter-
ates a tradition of pan-Asian cultural essentialism with some chauvinistic over-
tones.60 Most of these discussions do not seem to serve well the purpose to de-
velop a culturally sensitive, empirically sound and conceptually satisfying bio-
ethics “from Asians for Asians”. Their main flaw is the marginalisation and dis-
tortion of the potential of Asian and other cultural resources for responding to the 
serious challenges of biomedical modernisation. Heiner Roetz has argued that the 
logic of the arguments for  the “Third Way” in bioethics (and thereby, in bio-
politics) is merely a transformation of the political rhetoric of the Cold War.61  
A puzzling observation has to be noted here. It has to be acknowledged that 
many scholars have been raised in developing countries with oppressive ideo-
logical regimes and a recent history of brutal anti-intellectualism and cultural 
“Gleichschaltung” (especially during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 
China). This socio-biographical fact has to be taken into account when one at-
tempts a cultural interpretation, and should not, therefore, have escaped the atten-
tion of the promoters of bioethics in Asia. It is hence odd to note that hardly any 
mention of this factor can be found in the literature, neither from authors from the 
PRC, nor from regions such as Hong Kong, Taiwan or Chinese living overseas. 
Without acknowledging this sociological issue and the resulting political critique, 
especially of the framework of conditions necessary for any cultural expression to 
flourish within the ideologically and morally sensitive area of bioethics, it seems 
absurd to try to appreciate any achievements made and discuss options for further 
advancement. Within the Chinese life sciences discourse an additional complica-
tion awaits a cultural impact analysis. As historian of science in China, Lawrence 
Schneider, has pointed it out: 
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No ‘externality’ of science has been more problematic for 
China than the dependence on foreigners for science devel-
opment. ... It made a difference that virtually the entire lead-
ership of China’s emerging science community was trained 
abroad.62  
 
The dependence on foreign aid and standards and the need to build China’s bio-
ethics infrastructure in light of the “Western model”, with its inconsistencies and 
peculiarities, has certainly contributed to the desire for an emancipated Chinese 
approach. The focus of the mainstream bioethics discourse abroad (and the al-
most entire absence of different schools and practices in America and Europe in 
its perception), has led many Chinese authors to overlook the relatively marginal 
position of their foreign colleagues within their own academic communities. 
They tend to disregard the larger picture of philosophical ethics and social cri-
tique that would help to place them in proper context. The resulting shortcomings 
in empirical soundness, conceptual acumen and analytical rigor could be taken as 
the result of initial disadvantages in research facilities in a developing country. 
When combined with a general attitude of cultural peculiarity or even superiority, 
however, they simply appear crude. There may be better arguments available for 
sustaining the dualistic cliché of “East versus West” or “Relativism versus Uni-
versalism”, for those keen to continue such missions. In the meantime, bioethics 
as a discipline must continue to develop according to scientific standards and 
produce a conceptual framework and institutions that integrate ethical resources 
and cultural diversity in a constructive manner, with substantial contributions 
from properly educated Asian scholars.  
Just how big is the task? Tang Refeng has endeavoured to answer the ques-
tion, “What is ethical?” as follows: 
 
In analyzing ethical problems of developing countries, 
Western philosophers have found that many inhumane ac-
tivities in those countries have very deep cultural reasons. 
Circumcision and the illegality of abortion, for example, are 
both products of certain cultures or religions. Some Western 
philosophers think that the only way to argue against these 
wrongdoings is to emphasize that the ethical principles of 
Western society are general, intercultural and inviolable. I 
believe this is the main motivation of principlism. But they 
have not realized that their opponents are just like them in 
the sense that they are also principlists. They think that those 
principles endorsed by their own culture should not be vio-
lated. Both of them think that principles should not be vio-
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lated. The only difference is that they believe in different 
kinds of principle.63 
 
This quotation includes some typical misunderstandings and confusions of basic 
ethics. He may be exempted from elaborating on the differences between female 
circumcision and the illegality of abortion, but both certainly belong to different 
categories of violation. Circumcision is a concrete action, illegality of abortion a 
judgement of a concrete action in a legal form. More importantly, there is criti-
cism and resistance against both practices inside any country where they take 
place. People involved as “judges” or affected as victims argue against the inhu-
manity of such acts and the accompanying apologetics. In any event, the cultural 
argument at best delivers an empirical description. This can not and ought not to 
be accepted as a trump card against the expressed interests of the victims or ethi-
cal arguments, even when, or rather especially when such practices may be con-
sidered to have “very deep cultural reasons”.  
In contradiction to Tang’s assumption, avoiding the violation of principles is 
not a primary task of ethics. Ethics is all about preventing harm and suffering 
when they result from action, and understanding the meaning and functionality of 
harm. No serious ethics, whatever its origins, could insist on the positivistic and 
redundant reasoning of a formal meta-imperative such as “principles should not 
be violated”, though this might be part of an intellectual exercise in basic logic. 
The ethically relevant difference between “different kinds of principle” is exactly 
the one between good and bad principles (and related practice). The mere fact 
that people “believe” in different kinds of principle, be they humanist, fascist, or 
indifferent, etc., is not an argument in support of indifference towards the ethical 
quality of the respective principles.  
However, we might search for a key towards understanding the fundamental 
concept of “the humane”. Tang expressly requires that the humane can be com-
monly understood as an imperative for everyone. Such a universal moral claim 
has nothing to do with hegemonic conformity. The distinction between an ethical 
theory that necessarily, by virtue of being a theory, operates with (heuristic or 
axiomatic) principles, and a principalistic approach,64 marks a qualitative step in 
the exploration of philosophical horizons. It frees ethics from the considerations 
of secondary interests, distinguishes it among formalistic or merely descriptive 
avenues to what is normative, and makes a discourse on ethical issues and under-
standing possible in the first place. Arguments on behalf of the people in Asia 
would rise in credibility if they would explicitly acknowledge their own implicit 
assumptions. That is, the “Asianist” cases in these volumes always refer to some 
universal ethical concepts.  
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The strongest argument against the dogma of an essential cultural difference 
for Asian ethics is that, performatively and in the terms of consistency, it refutes 
itself, since everyone uses their reason and systematically prefers argument rather 
than physical fighting or apathy. Moreover, several Asian authors, though still a 
minority in the circles of Asian bioethics, hold reflected normative and transcen-
dental-universal ethical views, even without having studied ethics in “the West”. 
For example, Valavandan Manickavel from Nepal argues from the perspective of 
issues for the people, connecting an empirical description of ethical issues with 
an explicit critique against self-declared anti-universalism in bioethics: 
 
The local problem of the unfortunate or less fortunate had 
become an international issue in the globalizing process, as 
now whole nations have become unfortunate or less fortu-
nate relative to other nations. Let us focus on how the uni-
versality of ethical values and principles is being denied, 
concealed and ignored in favor of other interests.65 
 
Manickavel continues by addressing the activities of pharmaceutical business and 
research in the Asian region, identifying relevant actors and interests, especially 
those trying to profit from unequal standardisation and implementation of bio-
ethical norms.  
 
Projects or studies [that] were, for ethical reasons, not able 
to be conducted in other countries ..., get transferred to 
countries where ethical considerations are not such a prior-
ity. In most of these situations, locals were allowed to domi-
nate, and the universal governance of ethical values were 
undermined. ... The reality is that bioethics is being missed 
in these countries.66  
 
It is evident that the absence of universal ethical standards for the people’s sake 
and especially those to protect vulnerable populations, sustain problematic de-
velopments owing to the uninhibited activities of particular interests. For exam-
ple:  
 
The so-called local ethical reviews of the projects and stud-
ies are often biased and favor the views of the ruling party of 
the nation. ... The repeated rape of the environment and ex-
ploitation of weaker sections in Southern countries illus-
trates the lack of bioethical principles in action. This is due 
to the double standards adopted by Northern countries and 
                                                 
65
 V. Manickavel. “Living in Separation and Unequal Worlds: A Study in the Appli-
cation of Bioethics,” in Qiu (2004), p. 84. 
66
 Manickavel, in Qiu (2004), p. 85. 
147 Ole Döring: A Confucian Asian Ethos? 
the reluctance of Southern countries to follow bioethics, 
which is based on transcendental universal values. 
 
This small example is to indicate the significance of an empirically sound and 
methodically reasoned understanding of (political, economic, social) interests and 
power as real factors driving the development of the biomedical sciences. In 
comparison, vague references to the ethical relativity of “cultures” appear out-
moded and superficial.  
In this light, the emphasis on the undeniable ethical function of a universal 
conceptual framework as a heuristic reference should receive greater attention 
than is presently the case within the Asian bioethics communities.  
 
Ethical principles based on transcendent values always help 
humanity in providing justice to individuals, families, com-
munities and nations. In all circumstances, the transcen-
dence of justice is weighed against the immediate results or 
benefits.67 
 
In fact, these examples indicate one of the strong points of the anti-normative 
approach Qiu Renzong and his comrades propagate, since as an organiser and 
editor of the debate, he admits contributions that are designed to overcome paro-





To sum up, in their discussions of cultural aspects of bioethics Chinese authors 
hold mixed and often unexplained opinions on basic normative issues, such as the 
foundations of human rights. In several instances a thorough elaboration of these 
questions is overruled by the evident need for immediate responses to matters at 
hand, such as requests for policy advice. In fact, the practice of bioethics-on-
demand supports pragmatic institutions and tendencies. In these instances, cul-
tural arguments play no discernible role. Consequently, methodological questions 
concerning the possibility of cross-cultural understanding or on the ethics of 
communication in medicine and the communication of medical ethics are largely 
absent from the debate. On the other hand, fundamental questions are addressed 
in terms of the rhetoric of culturalistic differentiation or even self-defence. 
Experience of this debate should alert the observer as to whether, or to what 
extent, labels such as “Confucian” or “Chinese” are used on the basis of a solid 
theory and genuine understanding of the relevant cultures, or are employed 
merely for the sake of their rhetorical weight. An indicator for the validity of such 
labels can be seen in the way authors refer to the relevant substance of the litera-
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ture concerned, such as that on philosophical ethics, in particular whether they 
make their “cultural” references explicit. In general, there are many who use 
“culture” in a merely instrumental fashion, without proper textual evidence.68 
The spectre of rhetoric reaches from political propaganda, though gaining of a 
profile for the “cultural clashes” and “shortcuts of argument”, to pragmatic ends 
or chauvinistic self-appraisal.69  
The current development of bioethics in China is a fascinating area for the 
study of an emerging culture, making a contribution to academic nation building 
and ethical orientation. It carries with it conceptual fragments from ideologies 
such as Capitalism and Maoist Communism, cynicism and pragmatism, often in a 
rhetorical form of post-colonial defence and self-strengthening against foreign 
infringement of China’s integrity. It displays a large measure of material moral-
ity, including sincere moral concern, paternalistic medical morality and post-
modern libertarianism, and a fair portion of strategic argument.  
At present, in the absence of a proper theoretical Confucian bioethics frame-
work, conceptual guidance of substantial and procedural principles in bioethical 
discourse and the related policies is frequently sought for, or offered in, indistinct 
terms of “Confucian” doctrines, disregarding the ambivalent attitudes towards 
this school’s capability to cope with modernisation. This debate usually refers to 
vulgarised forms of “Confucianism”. In its present shape, it certainly cannot 
represent or constitute any “cultural” approach to bioethics.  
Nor is it a clear that either Confucianism or any other Asian school is able to 
serve as a resource for relativistic ethics. As Macklin notes, instead of an ap-
praisal of Asia’s contribution to bioethics that “merely replaces the puzzling with 
the obscure”, in light of the weight of the current ethical challenges for global 
bioethics and in order to be fair to the moral host of Asia’s traditions “we have to 
do better”70 than make it an ideological instrument. That is to say, we would 
welcome contributions from Asia that do not depend on a marginalisation of 
China’s scientific and philosophical capacities and on stereotypes of the “West”.  
Last but not least, a word on the relevant books. Although they are designed 
to stimulate the debate in East Asia, the pricing is way too high to make them 
affordable to individuals or indeed most institutions in developing countries.71 
Moreover, from a sinological point of view, there is a confusing lack of stan-
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dardisation. Neither Pinyin nor the Wade-Giles system of romanisation is used 
consistently. Editors obviously did not consult sinological experts. This situation 
calls for co-operation between those from different disciplines, e.g., sinologists in 
particular and bioethicists from all regions, in order to transform the patchwork 
of an emerging debate into a coherent scientific discourse that can embrace the 
cross-cultural aspects desired.  
